A shift towards ‘strategic interdependence’ could reinvigorate EU’s troubled North Africa policy
For every theory of foreign policy, there is an equal and opposite alternative. It is this strange postulate that seeks to portend the confusing consequences of Europe’s failed pursuit of some kind of strategic vision based on European exceptionalism.
Swimming against an undercurrent, Europe had sought, and was on the verge of finding, its place in the sun, somewhat disengaged from American hegemony and poised to benefit from China’s emergence and heady ambitions for the Global South, which powered by Russian energy, of course.
Unfortunately, a rash of crises, including the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, the surge in migrant arrivals and recent spasms in the Middle East, have conspired to uproot that dream, forcing Brussels back into more familiar geopolitical trenches.
This retreat will likely bury the remnants of the idea of ’strategic autonomy’, once the protagonist of European foreign policy in the post-war world against terrorism, now replaced by a more outward-looking and proactive ‘strategic interdependence’.
It is within this evolving diplomatic context that Europe needs to review its troubled North Africa policy, which has long been plagued by a lack of political will, unequal capabilities and divergent priorities among member states.
The EU has traditionally approached North Africa through a number of prisms, including managing migration, counter-terrorism and resource trade. Often, these have prioritized European self-interest over a more balanced approach, making it impossible to draw up effective policies to build a path towards fostering better ties or, at least, contributing to ameliorating some of the pressing challenges in the sub-region.
Driven by its strategic interests, the EU has long recognized the importance of forging strong ties with North Africa, which is its gateway to the young, resource-rich and growing African continent. This focus is nothing new, given the gradual development since the early 2000s of the European Neighborhood Policy in an effort to create frameworks for political dialogue and reform in the North African countries that are part of the bloc’s Southern Neighborhood.
In 2021, the EU launched a renewed agenda for the Southern Mediterranean, with the aim of further integrating these economies into the EU edifice. Two years later, however, North Africa is nowhere close to achieving a region-wide free trade agreement, nor has the issue of EU-Maghreb integration moved beyond the realm of fiction.
Europe is stuck and we can only hope that a new, more dynamic approach to trade, security, migration and energy will help realize the contours of this new ‘strategic interdependence’.
Today, the subregion remains largely at arm’s length, its instability perceived more as a distant threat than an immediate challenge to Europe’s geostrategic interests. As such, the end result is a jumble of conflicting priorities, questionable maneuvering, absenteeism, one-sided bilateralism, unforced errors, and, as evidenced in Libya, utter disarray.
In short, Brussels has consistently failed to engage meaningfully with the complex socio-political nuances of the sub-region grossly underestimating, even dismissing, the importance of promoting fair, mutually beneficial relations.
Inevitably, instead of having strong foundations and robust frameworks for mutual cooperation, we instead have damaging misconceptions, unfulfilled potential and institutional resistance to replacing flawed policies with assertive, collaborative approaches to North Africa, ideally rooted in the principles of strategic interdependence.
As we stand on the precipice of a new world order in which middle powers increasingly shape the terms of engagement, the EU needs to upgrade its relationship with North Africa urgently. On paper, strategic interdependence looks promising as it eschews a Eurocentric narrative in favor of a more nuanced understanding of engagements with external powers while recognizing the inherent interconnections that shape these relationships.
It also forces the EU to recognize its limitations, while also identifying areas in which it has significant influence. Rather than striving for self-sufficiency or dominance, it encourages a shift towards a fair, equal footing with external partners.
This requires navigating around political coexistence, competitiveness and key relationships rather than defending the crumbling state of a bygone era that is largely responsible for the current malaise.
Strategic interdependence in the EU’s North Africa policy will certainly strengthen the bloc’s interactions with the region, although a growing undercurrent of Western antipathy will complicate such an axis. A focus on interdependencies, however, could facilitate greater engagement in a number of areas, including climate, migration and socio-economic partnerships, thereby strengthening ties and fostering more effective cooperation.
If successful, such a long-term approach will naturally evolve into a conduit for a more nuanced understanding of each North African country’s distinct aspirations and imperatives as part of overall policy-making.
By shedding the lazy, “single” diplomacy du jour, the EU could finally achieve something that has eluded many of its established politicians and women: Constructive engagement with the bloc’s immediate neighborhood on the basis of common interests and expectations, resulting in meet North Africa halfway, while curtailing the one-sided approach that marred previous engagement policies and strategies to navigate the sub-region’s common crises.
However, this does not mean that the path to strategic interdependence will be without challenges. A critical condition will be the EU’s political will to adopt a more “tactical” approach to help secure its interests in an ever-changing geopolitical landscape in which the lines blur between friends, foes, contenders and aggressors.
Europe’s effort to reinvigorate its ties with North Africa will likely bear more fruit if it is rooted in honest, harmless talk of the bloc’s vested interests in areas of potential cooperation. Such a transparent approach would position it more as an honest participant in an increasingly multipolar world, without limiting or denying the action of sharp-eyed counterparts wary of any version of neocolonialism.
Moreover, while “moral justice” might have shaped the contours of commitment in the world of the past, that world has changed. Finding common ground instead of demanding submission to elusive, broad positions on so-called “universal values” will go much further, provided it is backed by tangible financial support.
Europe must therefore strive to foster trust in partnerships through constructive discussions on a range of related issues, such as debt sustainability, climate change compensation, infrastructure development, healthcare, education and immigration, to name just a few.
It is vital for the bloc to approach these affairs with a clear understanding of their inherently transactional dynamics and engage fully on the basis of overlapping interests. Over time, the recognition of strategic interdependence and its differentiated approach to cooperation will require acceptance of a new, fragmented world order.
This in no way means that Europe should isolate itself. Instead, constructive engagement with non-Western actors becomes critical, not only for addressing global challenges but also for advancing Europe’s own agenda.
Commitment to these new rules of engagement will determine whether or not the EU emerges as a shaper in shaping this new world order, and it starts in its own proverbial ‘backyard’.
The transition from autonomy to interdependence should not be a simple change in terminology, or a window dressing to cover up a repetition of past failures. It should be a fundamental reorientation of Europe’s diplomatic posture, meaning a move away from a self-centered, introverted approach to a more proactive, outward-looking one that emphasizes coexistence, competition and core relationships.
Such a shift could prove instrumental in strengthening Europe’s engagement with North Africa, a region where geopolitical instability directly affects Europe’s security and energy dynamics and unprecedented increases in migrants add to the challenges.
For too long, the EU has been bound by a flawed approach defined by one-sided interests. If Brussels hopes to revitalize its strategy and influence in North Africa, it must signal its willingness to learn from the past, adapt to present realities and participate meaningfully in the emerging world order.
- Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and executive director of the North Africa Initiative (IKSI) at the Foreign Policy Institute at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC, and a former adviser to the chancellor of the World Bank Group’s board of directors. Twitter: @HafedAlGhwell
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