Free grain for Africa: reading Russia’s mind
Last week, Russia sent 200,000 tons of grain to six African states, as promised at the two-day Russia-Africa Summit in St. Petersburg in July. The forum was held after Moscow withdrew from the grain deal brokered by the UN and Turkey, known as the Black Sea Grains Initiative. Among the first receipts of Russian grain are Burkina Faso and Somalia, in addition to Zimbabwe, Mali, Eritrea and the Central African Republic, which will receive grain soon.
Reading the news, I remembered an anecdote from about six years ago. While on a plane, I happened to meet a high representative responsible for foreign policy for one of Russia’s regions. In response to my curiosity about his strategic foreign policy objectives, he revealed that key strategic interests lie in Africa as the region is rich in resources. It is also an area where change – and opportunity – is constant, due to political instability, military insurgencies (particularly in Niger and Mali) and poor governance. The High Representative also acknowledged that there are currently only limited diplomatic initiatives towards Africa. With this incident in mind, this week I decided to try to read Russia’s thinking about Africa and its growing importance on several different levels.
It is widely known that for several years, Moscow’s influence in Africa was carried out through the Wagner Group paramilitary, which “made Russia even bigger on every continent — and Africa even freer,” according to its former boss Yevgeny Prigozhin . The mercenary organization has been actively involved in many states on the continent, particularly in the Central African Republic and Mali.
However, with the Ukraine war, Russia’s need to spread its influence globally has become ever greater. For example, the conflict has reportedly shaped the attitudes of most Central Asian and South Caucasian countries, distancing themselves from Moscow while maintaining relations and at the same time building closer dialogue with Western partners, including the EU and the US. A typical example is that while the Russian delegation, with its leader, traveled to Kazakhstan to consolidate bilateral relations, the Kazakh leader Kassym-Jomart Tokayev closed his speech in Kazakh, instead of Russian, signaling changes in the country’s course.
Russia has redoubled its focus on Africa’s Sahel region.
Dr. Diana Galeeva
In contrast, other regions, including Africa and the Middle East, have generally expressed support and interest in building closer dialogue with Moscow, as opposed to the West’s goal of isolating Moscow. At the same time, these areas have become essential to avoid global isolation. For example, in February, Paul Stronski, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Program on Russia and Eurasia, argued that despite the war in Ukraine, Moscow has not curtailed its goals in the global south. Russia has redoubled its focus on Africa’s Sahel region, which includes territory from Senegal to the Red Sea. Moscow’s growing importance there is partly linked to Western policy mistakes, growing anti-European sentiment and long-standing rifts among global and local actors seeking to address the causes of regional instability. Given today’s geopolitical changes, Africa has become a hub for many economic and political goals.
The Russia-Africa Summit in July aimed to further develop the narrative of promoting a multipolar world order and combating “neo-colonialism”. Russian President Vladimir Putin called for “joint determination to confront neo-colonialism, the practice of applying illegal sanctions and attempts to undermine traditional moral values.” Subsequently, representatives of 49 countries signed a joint declaration aimed at “establishing a more just, balanced and stable multipolar world order, strongly opposed to any kind of international confrontation on the African continent”. The African region is a crucial Kremlin ally on multipolarity, driven significantly by Moscow’s association with “colonialism/neocolonialism” as part of the narrative.
Africa is a bridge to another essential region for Russia’s “multipolarity” – the Middle East and North Africa. Russia’s growing influence in Libya is a case in point, demonstrated by the fact that in September, Marshal Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army, met with Putin. His talks with Russian officials reportedly included renewed plans for Libya. Meetings with Deputy Defense Minister Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who traveled to Benghazi in August, led to discussions about the future role in the country of the Wagner Group, which has now been assimilated into the Russian military after the coup attempt in June. Also, Libya is a neighbor of Algeria, which despite Western condemnations of Russia, has expressed interest in deepening ties with Moscow, especially in the military field. This move also fits regional dynamics, since Algeria’s rival Morocco has in recent years moved closer to the West.
The African region is a crucial Kremlin ally on multipolarity.
Dr. Diana Galeeva
In addition, the active involvement of the UAE, Egypt and Russia in Libya also adds to the growing bilateral partnership with regional actors. For example, at the diplomatic level, in 2020, Russia “sought” Egypt and the UAE for successful talks on the Libyan crisis. In March, Haftar told Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu that the Egyptian military had agreed to “inform” Moscow about the US mail. These examples show how diplomatically, militarily, and security-wise, all these regions are interconnected, making North Africa strategically important as a bridge to the Middle East, for Russia’s goals.
Therefore, Russia’s interest in Africa is not a “new initiative” as suggested by some mainstream media during the Africa-Russia forum. Both from an established history of engagement and from my own experience, mentioned earlier, Russian representatives have found Africa attractive for many reasons and for some time. However, before the Ukraine war, Russia had mainly used hard power sources for influence there through the Wagner Group. The heavier allocation of military resources in Europe has forced Moscow to more actively pursue soft power initiatives.
The region is of strategic importance to Moscow’s goals for a “multipolar” world order, in addition to its strategic geographic location, bridging other regions, including the Middle East. As such, the free grain deal is simply a logical continuation of Kremlin policies, albeit under a milder guise. Finally, these changes are also interesting to explore as they are evidence of broader geopolitical changes: As many traditional neighbors and allies in Russia’s sphere of influence drift away, other regions, including many African countries, are moving closer to Moscow.
• Dr. Diana Galeeva is a visiting academic at the University of Oxford.
X: @Dr_GaleevaDiana
Disclaimer: The views expressed by the authors in this section are their own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Arab News