In article published in February, the Wall Street Journal chronicled efforts by U.S. government officials to counter China’s plans for a military base in the central African nation of Gabon. This news is not surprising. For years officials and media have referred to China’s efforts to pursue a military presence in West Africa, allowing it access to the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean for the first time. Similarly, US officials also claimed China was seeking a military base in neighboring Equatorial Guineaat Bata Harbour, though no such base or structure appears to have yielded so far.
This year marks the 50th anniversary of the China-Gabon relationship. In recent years, this relationship has only strengthened. China became Gabon’s top trading partner, with two-way trade reaching $4.55 billion in 2022. In 2016, during former President Ali Bongo’s visit to China, Bongo and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, upgraded the China-Gabon relationship to “comprehensive cooperation.” In 2018 and 2023Chinese navy ships docked in Gabon for friendly visits.
In April last year, Gabon and China upgraded their relationship again, this time to “comprehensive strategic partnership.” China noted at the time that “the Chinese military is ready to work with the Gabonese side to sincerely fulfill the important concessions reached by the two heads of state, intensify high-level exchanges, and actively carry out all-round pragmatic cooperation so as to raise both the level and the quality of relations between millions and make a positive contribution to international and regional peace and stability.”
After the 2023 coup that ousted Bongo, it is yet to be determined how the China-Gabon relationship will continue under interim President Brice Clothier Oligui Ngema, especially as the US seeks to further undermine that partnership.
While China has already invested in multiple commercial ports along the West African coast – such as Kribi Port in Cameroon, Lekki Port in Nigeria and Lome Port in Togo – a military presence in the Gulf of Guinea would allow the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to expand beyond its current waters in the Indo-Pacific and the Gulf of Aden in the Atlantic Ocean, opening the door for the Chinese military to the rest of the world . A base in West Africa would allow the PLA to conduct longer and more remote missions than is currently possible, as Chinese ships would be able to refit, rest and refuel in such safe locations.
As for the United States, recently surpassed by the PLA Navy (PLAN) in fleet sizeit would also mean an increasing proximity of the Chinese military to US soil on the Atlantic side.
The big picture: China’s push for a global maritime presence
China’s efforts to establish a permanent military base in West Africa are part of its larger push for a global military presence. In 2016, construction began at the Port of Dolareh in Djibouti. A little later it was revealed that the The PLA had built its first overseas base there: the Support Base of the People’s Liberation Army.
Since its success in Djibouti, the Chinese government has embarked on a campaign to build a global maritime presence, through commercial investment and through security facilities. His second hit is the construction at Cambodian naval base Ream. Although Ream is not intended exclusively for Chinese use, and both China and Cambodia have strongly denied that it is a Chinese military installation, a Chinese official confirmed that parts of the newly expanded Ream base will also be made available for PLA use. The docking of two PLAN warships in December 2023;which left Ream in mid-Januaryfurther confirmed the news.
And it doesn’t stop there. The US Department of Defense’s October 2023 China Military Power Report described that the PRC has already considered “Burma [Myanmar]Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and Tajikistanas possible locations and that it has probably already attempted to establish bases in Namibia, Vanuatu and the Solomon Islands. In comparison, a June 2023 AidData publication points to eight potential base locations, based on Chinese financial flows abroad: Hambantota, Sri Lanka; Bata, Equatorial Guinea; Gwadar, Pakistan; Kribi, Cameroon? Ream, Cambodia; Vanuatu? Nacala, Mozambique; and Nouakchott, Mauritania.
Beyond these ambitions for a global military presence, China has also invested heavily in owning ports and terminals overseas. In total, Chinese companies are responsible for 92 port projects, with 13 having majority Chinese stakes. While some of these port projects date back years, China’s incentives for acquiring port shares may have evolved alongside its growing power. And, as China’s influence on global ports has grown, international concerns have arisen about the potential for these sites to be used as dual-use facilities, serving commercial and military vessels, especially as at a third of these facilities PLAN warships have already made port calls and docked.
Some host governments have already begun to push back against this dual-use nature of their ports and commercial assets, with Sri Lanka recently issued a one-year docking ban on foreign research vesselsdespite China’s 99-year lease of the port of Habadota.
China’s Maritime Strategy
Among these recent developments, it is no longer a conjecture but rather an emerging fact that China is working to develop a network of investments, ports, facilities and bases to create a global maritime presence that will enable it to exercise and assume power abroad. . Despite its efforts to build this deliberate network of maritime assets and facilities since 2016, China’s efforts to establish a maritime presence remain and will continue to be highly dependent on the geopolitical context.
While the current developments in Djibouti and Rehm have followed different patterns, the case of Gabon may resemble China’s approach in the first establishment of an anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden; before settling in a PLA base in Djibouti, as the Gulf of Guinea also faces piracy issues and as Chinese ships have been affected by this.
While China’s approach will continue to adapt in the future, this emerging web of maritime presence already requires action by the United States and interested partners. Recently, the US Development Finance Corporation (DFC) committed $553 million in loans to build a new deepwater container terminal at the port of Colombo, Sri Lanka, with the Indian-led Adani Group leading the construction. This comes in the context of the Chinese port of Hambantota, which in recent years has sparked speculation that it will become the site of China’s military presence overseas. This recent investment marked a first step in combining commercial investment with US government action to thwart China’s efforts.
The US government appears to have stepped up efforts in preventing a Chinese base in West Africa over the past two years. However, rather than reacting to these site-specific scriptsWashington must focus on a multifaceted strategy of trade investment, diplomatic talks and security partnerships to meet – and anticipate – China’s quest for a maritime presence abroad.