mMUCH TIME on April 7, Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda, commemorates the start of the most heinous event of the late 20th century, the Rwandan genocide. Over 100 days in 1994, masses of the majority Hutu population slaughtered hundreds of thousands of their compatriots, mostly from the minority Tutsi group. In these annual speeches, Mr Kagame gives a glimpse into why he is Africa’s most polarizing leader. In one breath there is the official narrative: Rwanda is now a miracle of peace, unity and prosperity—a beacon of progress lit from the embers of genocide. In the next there are hints of the more sinister figure his detractors deplore, for example in his contempt for those who doubt him. They also point to his brutal repression and warmongering in neighboring Congo.
Ahead of the 30th anniversary of the genocide, some observers in Kigali, the capital, hope Mr Kagame will use this year’s event to move beyond the question of whether Rwanda is Africa’s Singapore or Africa’s North Korea. About two-thirds of Rwanda’s population is under the age of 30. Perhaps, some diplomats and businessmen speculate, the 66-year-old president is talking about the next 30 years, loosening the grip of his authoritarian state and suggesting when he will step aside?
This is unlikely. In the “land of a thousand hills” only one person can have the moral high ground. On July 15 Mr Kagame will almost certainly be re-elected president by a margin that would make even Vladimir Putin blush, in a vote that is neither free nor fair. Having won 98% of the vote in a constitutional referendum in 2015 that still allows him to seek two more terms that run until 2034, he is going nowhere.
To assess Rwanda today, one can look at Mr. Kagame’s policies in three different places: at home, in the greater Great Lakes region, and in the rest of the world. Against them appears a picture of some reform and reconciliation, with a lot of repression and realpolitik. Central to Mr Kagame’s domestic agenda is state-enforced brainwashing. In the ingado (“solidarity”) camps and in prisons, an official narrative is drummed into the population. It is a story that emphasizes Rwandan national identity over nationalism and that fails to mention any of the crimes committed by Mr. Kagame’s party, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).
For the government, the case for top-down reconciliation is obvious, given that the perpetrators live side by side with the victims’ families. Has it worked? A state-sponsored “reconciliation barometer” shows that nearly 100% of Rwandans respond positively to questions about whether they are tolerant, trusting and united. Phil Clarke of the School of Oriental and African Studies at the University of London has written that “most Rwandans … chose to move on with their lives rather than settle old scores”.
Other researchers argue that in Rwanda reconciliation is often superficial. Susan Thomson of Colgate University has described the “everyday resistance” to governmental schemes. This includes people keeping quiet or even laughing during community meetings and sneaking critical messages in the greengrocers.
Although it is impossible to see into the hearts of ordinary Rwandans, one can see the repression that came with reconciliation. Expansive laws banning “divisiveness” and genocide denial are used against dissidents. A system in which neighbors spy on each other keeps a close eye on the villagers. Journalists and opposition politicians have been jailed and some have died under mysterious circumstances. Opponents of the regime outside the country have been harassed and, in some cases, killed.
Rwanda likes it when visitors focus on Kigali’s clean streets, glittering convention center, lack of petty corruption and mountain gorillas. Western diplomats praise Rwanda’s efficient use of aid, which accounts for about 75 percent of government spending. Such is the interest from other African officials that there is now a special service explaining how they can use Rwanda’s methods. It is a sign of what Ken Opalo, a Kenyan academic, calls “Rwanda envy”.
Some of it is justified. GDP increased by more than 8% per year on average from 1995 to 2022. Life expectancy increased from 49 years to 66 between 2001 and 2021. Child mortality decreased by 77%.
However, Rwanda’s success may be less than meets the eye. Several researchers have credibly argued that official poverty measurements underestimate its true extent. Others disputed the official figures on agricultural yields. Only 2% of Rwandans own refrigerators, a symbol of African middle-class life. This is much lower than the rate in other countries such as Ethiopia (6%) and Tanzania (10%) that have similar income levels, according to the Global Data Lab based at Radboud University in the Netherlands.
Privately many Rwandans complain of wide gaps between rich and poor. The country has a higher Gini coefficient, a benchmark for income inequality, than regional peers. The sense that the gains from development are going largely to a narrow elite could be socially dangerous. A study shows that Tutsi, who make up 10-15% of the population, hold 80% of the top jobs in government and state-owned companies such as Crystal Ventures, which is run by RPF, and Horizon, which is run by the military. Some scholars praise these companies for investing in the economy, although they can also deter investors by stifling competition.
However, Mr Kagame’s ambitions have never been limited by his country’s borders. In the 1980s, together with other Tutsi exiles in Uganda, they helped Yoweri Museveni take power in that country. In the early 1990s RPF they fought against the then Hutu-led regime in Rwanda, and in 1994 marched on Kigali to end the genocide, which was sparked when a plane carrying Juvenal Habyarimana, president of Rwanda, was shot down. In 1997 Mr. Kagame and Mr Museveni together ousted Mobutu Sese Soku, Congo’s dictator for three decades, after he gave sanctuary to Rwandan army and militia leaders who had taken part in the genocide. When the man who replaced him, Laurent Kabila, proved less pliable, Rwanda invaded again, sparking a war that resulted in the loss of 1-5 million lives, mostly from starvation and disease.
Rwanda, which appears to export more minerals than it mines domestically, has maintained a strong presence in resource-rich areas of eastern Congo. According to UNITED NATIONS, supports an armed group known as M23, who is accused of murder and rape and is close to seizing the regional capital, Goma, increasing tension between Congo and Rwanda. “War could break out at any moment,” worries one Western diplomat.
Rwanda’s supporters argue that its actions in eastern Congo are in self-defense and to protect the Tutsis. The Rwandan government points out that there are links between the Congolese army and a group known as FDLR, which traces its origins to Hutu genocidals who fled in 1994. However, there is more to Rwanda’s involvement. The last spasm of violence from MThe 23 followed Congolese moves to sideline Rwanda by inviting Burundian and Ugandan troops into the country and moving closer to Kenya’s economic orbit. Michela Wrong, a journalist, wrote last year that: “Kagame has long believed in his right to be unrestrained [“unavoidable”] not only in Rwanda but also in the region, the continent and even in the world arena”.
Some of the early aid to Rwanda was motivated by the West’s guilt that it had failed to intervene to stop the genocide. some because Rwanda was proof that aid to Africa could actually work. Increasingly, however, it is Mr. Kagame’s transactional realpolitik that is securing the support of Western countries. Britain, for example, wants to send asylum seekers there. Some in the Rwandan government lament the deal because they see it as tarnishing its brand, but there have been benefits. Britain has agreed to pay 370 million pounds ($470 million) for the “cooperation” until 2026, about ten times its annual contributions to the country, with more cash if asylum seekers arrive. This contrasts with Britain’s 2012 response to a M23 offensive when he cut off aid to Rwanda.
France, too, is welcoming Mr. Kagame. For years relations were strained because a French judge accused him RPF of the downing of the plane carrying Habyarimana, whose regime was supported by Paris. Emmanuel Macron, who in 2021 in Kigali asked for forgiveness for France’s role during the genocide, has mended relations. The EU funds Rwanda’s deployment against jihadists in Mozambique, near where Total, a French energy giant, is building a massive natural gas project. In February, to the fury of Congo, the bloc announced a deal to boost Rwanda’s mineral exports.
America has taken a tougher stance. It has sanctioned a Rwandan general for his alleged role in the support M23 and suspended military aid. But America remains Rwanda’s biggest donor and is reluctant to alienate Mr. Kagame, an ally with a powerful military he is willing to send to volatile parts of Africa. The Rwandan leader also knows his way around Washington. in February he frustrated MPs at a prayer breakfast. (In contrast, a South African delegation showed up during the break and struggled to meet anyone.)
Indeed, Rwanda has seemingly managed to stay friends with those across many political divides. China has built most of Rwanda’s main roads and sells weapons to it. Mr Kagame praised Russia’s role in Africa — yet it will be one of the few African countries to soon host a new Ukrainian embassy. Rwanda expressed sympathy for Israel after the massacre by Hamas on October 7, but has also sent baby formula to Gaza. Qatar is a major investor in Rwanda, but this month Kigali welcomed a delegation from its rival, the United Arab Emirates. “Kageme understands that, ultimately, diplomacy is about interests,” says one diplomat.
When the Rwandan leader speaks on April 7, many foreign dignitaries will be in attendance. When he wins re-election in July, few of them will speak. There is a grim logic to such reticence: Mr Kagame will be calling the shots for at least another decade. But as he begins his fourth decade as Rwanda’s leader, the outside world might want to ponder a question. How stable can Rwanda really be if it depends on the rule of a single man? ■