Since the start of the war against Ukraine, Russia’s policies in Africa have entered the international political consciousness. Certainly, they pushed US policy makers to take much more account of Africa, as we can see President Biden meets with African leaders and Secretary of State Blinken’s current trip there.
But aside from the need for increased US attention to Africa and possibly the entire so-called Global South, we have to ask whether there is a distinct Russian strategy here, and if so, what are its goals?
Evidence of what those goals and objectives are is abundant if we look for it. And, arguably, this evidence reveals that there is a strategy of tactical opportunism being used to achieve broader strategic goals.
It has been clear for some time that Moscow is using the full range of state-directed instruments of power to gain influence and leverage across Africa. We can categorize these instruments of power using the military acronym of DIME, i.e. diplomatic, informational, military and economic instruments of power. They are orchestrated from Moscow across Africa, from Cairo to Cape Town and from East to West.
In previous, and much larger projectsI described how these means have been used to gain access to valuable mining and raw material concessions, train officers and gain access to armies through arms deals, and conduct information warfare on behalf of pro-Moscow leaders or leadership candidates there.
In all these cases, Russia has entered African countries, often at the behest of one faction or another, to help its clients prevail in the various factional, inter-ethnic and/or inter-state rivalries that pervade the continent. The most notorious and well-known example of this kind of intervention was the state-sponsored Wagner mercenary army.
But Wagner’s record shows that it provided civilian assistance, often but not always successfully providing “government in a box” services. It won mining concessions, supervised and trained the military, and conducted political campaigns and information warfare on behalf of Russia’s clients.
While Moscow relied on Wagner and other agents or weapons of its government, it also sought to gain permanent and hegemonic, if not exclusive, influence over these states. After a failed civil disobedience and rebellion last year, Wagner founder and leader Yevgeny Prigozhin and his lieutenants paid with their lives. Moscow took advantage of this situation to reshape this body into yet another completely subordinate to Putin, called the Afrika Korps. This team, whose Third Reich influenced name it is by no means an accident and indicates where Russian winds are blowing, now continuing in Wagner’s footsteps to expand Russian power and influence.
On this basis, we can outline Russia’s strategic goals. It seeks to gain sanctuaries and lasting hubs of influence in African states for access to raw materials, energy assets and contracts for infrastructure projects, nuclear power plants and arms sales. This revenue is then returned to the Russian rent-seeking elite through the state, which is itself a rent-collecting mechanism. Building on the foundation of Russia’s continued economic presence in the state, it seeks to keep in power authoritarian leaders who will support its foreign policy initiatives against the West.
To put it more bluntly, in Africa, Moscow is looking for docile or calm governments that give it a free hand and the continued extraction of rents from it in exchange for support to stay in power. They support Russian foreign policy initiatives or do not oppose them very seriously, e.g. the war in Ukraine, in exchange for this Russian support in their tenure.
But the ultimate prize in Africa is long-term Russian land, sea and/or air bases. Access through these bases to the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean it is especially valuable. Indeed, since the time of Catherine the Great, Moscow has sought these bases because of Russia’s historical engagement and obsession with Byzantium, Constantinople, and now Constantinople.
Many objectives are associated with this quest for these bases. They seem to confirm Russia’s equal obsession with great power status, which stems from its ability to intimidate everyone, project imperial power abroad and portray its navy as a heavyweight competitor – which it is not. . More importantly, Moscow has sought unsuccessfully a base in Sudan for years to project a nuclear deterrent at sea against the West because a draft agreement was supposed to allow Russia to host nuclear ships there.
But aside from the decades-long search for a base there or elsewhere in the Horn of Africa and/or entering the Red Sea, eg EritreaMoscow has renewed efforts to a base or bases in Libya. Beyond these states, he has secured the of the Central African Republic consent for a military base and preparations for construction have begun there. Moscow has also repeatedly expressed its desire to build one based in Algeria to no avail and one in Angola in the South Atlantic in 2023.
His goals are clear. And these ambitions – hegemonic influence, economic exploitation for its own benefit and long-term naval bases – represent the quintessence of imperialism.
So why don’t we spread it to the world and Africa?
Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Institute for Foreign Policy Research and an independent consultant focusing on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia, and Eurasia. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the US War College Institute for Strategic Studies and a former MacArthur Fellow at the US War College.
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