The security situation in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) continues to deteriorate. The region includes the provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri. It is about seven times the size of neighboring Rwanda.
The violence in North Kivu has drawn most of the attention of the DRC’s neighbors and International community. This special attention is aimed at prevention potential confrontation between Rwanda and the DRC.
Since late 2021, North Kivu has been facing M23 rebels who have executed people and forcibly displaced thousands within the province and outside the DRC. The DPRK and UN officials blamed Rwanda supports M23 rebels. Kigali denies it.
In mid-2022, the East African Community sent a regional power in the DRC to stop the M23 military advance in an effort to address the rising tension between the DRC and Rwanda. The PRC shares a 2,500 km border with five East African countries: Burundi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda.
Since this development, however, DRC President Felix Tshisekedi and the people of North Kivu have criticized the power of East Africa, accusing her of delaying the M23. The future of the force will be decided in an East African community summit of heads of state on November 24, 2023.
The leadership of the PRC is now looking support by another regional bloc, the Southern African Development Community (Sadec). Sadec has committed to deploy a military unit in North Kivu In the next few days. The DRC is a member of Sadec, as are its neighbors Tanzania, Zambia and Angola.
The Sadec mission will they support the Congolese army in its effort to root out M23 and other armed groups operating in eastern Congo. It is not yet clear whether these troops will replace the East African force or work alongside it. Either way, this development comes after the gradual planned withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the DPRK beginning in December 2023.
Read more: Rwanda and the DPRK’s troubled pasts continue to fuel their murky relationship
As a researcher on micro-level violence, I have studied the drivers of conflict in eastern DRC since 2017. In my view, there are four risks to the proposed Sadec mission. These are:
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it would mainly target M23 rebels, leaving out the other armed groups in eastern DRC
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could give Rwanda more room to exploit the strength of the M23 rebels
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could compete with the East African Community, which the DRC joined in 2022
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the Sadec force could end up being outnumbered over a vast area.
The focus on the M23 rebels
The main mission for the Sadec force would be to stabilize and contribute to peace building in eastern DRC. The danger is that this mission, especially if deployed under the flag of the Congolese national army, could end up condescending to the military’s perspective.
This perspective tends to focus on and ignore the danger posed by M23 armed groups (over 120) operating in eastern Congo. In addition, it tends to host other armed groups that commit atrocities against civilians. In dealing with M23 attacks, the military has cooperated with foreign and local militiasproviding them weapons and ammunition.
The Sadec mission in the DRC may end up trapped in the approach of the Congolese army. This would be dangerous for the stability of the region. Some of them local and foreign the militias have vowed to eradicate ethnic communities who believe they are not “real Congolese”.
Any regional power aiming to stabilize eastern Congo should remain neutral in its actions and be alive to the ways in which Congolese army has incited violence and committed atrocities against civilians.
Rwanda and the M23
Efforts to stabilize eastern DRC should separate Rwandan grievances from those of the M23.
The rebel group claims to be fighting for the rights of the Congolese Tutsi and other ethnic communities in the Kivus. Rwanda, for its part, accuses the DRC of working with a rebel force, the FDLR, which seeks to overthrow the Rwandan government and operates outside Congo. In a 2022 report, a UN panel of experts on the DPRK claimed that Rwanda armed the M23 rebels to be able to hunt down FDLR fighters. Rwanda has rejected such allegations.
M23 cause should not be are exploited. Instead, the possibility of peaceful negotiations between the rebels and the Congolese government to address grievances should be preferred.
However, the Congolese army and Tshisekedi’s attitude against the M23 – particularly ahead of DRC general elections in December 2023 – could push Sadec forces to opt for a military solution to the rebel group’s offensive. Sadec should be careful not to support a stance that ends up forcing M23 to remain a rebel force that regional countries could manipulate for their own agenda.
DRC and its neighbors
Competition with the East African Community
The strength of the East African Community is was widely criticized from Kinshasa and the people of North Kivu for failing to attack the M23 rebels. The public – under the influence of Congolese political figures – tends to see the threat posed by M23 and ignore other forms of violence in the region.
Kinshasa has demonized rebel power and its ties to Rwanda for political mileage. The failure of East African troops’ efforts to eradicate M23 after less than two years is premature. Especially since the UN peacekeeping mission, Monusco, has been in the DRC for more than two decades.
The upside of East African Community intervention is that combines political consultations and dialogue between different belligerents. It is unclear what will happen to the peace talks that have begun former Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta; if the Sadec mission replaces the East African one.
Limited force power over a vast area
Eastern DRC includes at least 120 armed groups and borders Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda and Burundi. As such, the Sadec mission in the DRC will take on multiple rebel forces in a vast region with complex politics. It risks its efforts being criticized like those of the East African Community for its limited capacity to address the root causes of violence in eastern Congo.
The Sadec force could choose focus on attack M23 Rebels – the way the group was first uprooted in 2012-2013. Or it will be lost in the vast jungles of eastern Congo. Either scenario will not bring lasting peace.
Many of the drivers of violence in eastern DRC are linked to the absence of the state in the daily lives of ordinary Congolese. This is largely due to the focus of political elites on their own survival. Therefore, a purely military approach to dealing with violence would be ill-advised.