In response to the escalating crisis in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the United Nations Security Council created a panel of independent experts in 2023 to review the situation and provide it with options for dealing with the conflict. In June 2024, the UN published the commission’s final report.
The report provides a devastating account of the unimaginable scale of violence against civilians. It also shows the failure of state actors to work together to bring peace to the region. The parties involved β particularly the governments of Rwanda, Uganda and the DRC β have he protested their innocence.
I have was investigated violent extremism in Africa, particularly its impact on southern and central Africa; The reluctance of ruling elites across central Africa to accept responsibility for the war raises the question of what needs to be done to promote peace and development.
A military option is clearly not sufficient to address the deep historical, ethnic, and resource-based rifts across central Africa as they play out in the DRC. Relations between presidents in the region, especially the DRC and Rwanda, have been strained over this history.
To bolster stabilization measures, African leaders must pursue diplomatic options. This includes an emergency ceasefire. It must be accompanied by disengagement of forces and neutralization of the insurgent Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, which operates from the PRC. There must also be confidence-building measures between the parties to the conflict.
Before looking at the options, let’s unpack some of the key findings of the UN report.
The report identifies the following causes of war and obstacles to peace:
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extreme violence β against men, women and children
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a humanitarian crisis
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illegal resource extraction
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new forms of warfare
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intervention of neighbors and international actors.
Deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation
Prolonged armed violence has exacerbated a dire humanitarian crisis. North Kivu province accounted for nearly 1.7 million internally displaced people. Another half a million have poured into neighboring South Kivu since October 2023.
Goma, the capital of North Kivu, has experienced escalating crime and political unrest due mainly to the spread of so-called Vazalendo armed militias and criminal gangs, and unruly elements of the DPRK Armed Forces.
The UN commission found that all armed actors recruited and used children in hostilities on an unprecedented scale. The Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) and the Rwandan Defense Force punished civilians perceived to be collaborating with enemy armed groups.
Wazalendo groups thrived on a brutal war economy β looting, extortion, kidnapping and killing civilians. In Ituri Province, armed groups have engaged in violent confrontations and rivalries, some of them over lucrative gold mining sites.
Dynamics of North Kivu
In North Kivu, ISIS-linked Allied Democratic Forces have intensified attacks against urban centers since mid-October 2023. They are also active in Uganda. The commission found that they committed the largest number of murders, mostly of civilians. The group established strong networks in prisons, particularly in Kinshasa, where its inmates recruited and mobilized fighters and collaborators.
The DRC government continued to use Wazalendo groups to fight M23. Most of the armed actors in North Kivu benefited from illegal logging and taxing the transport of wooden planks into the areas they control.
New forms of warfare
The development of advanced military technology and equipment has strengthened M23-Rwanda joint military operations. They have changed the dynamics of the conflict, in part by grounding all of the DPRK’s military air assets β including attack and transport helicopters and transport planes.
The UN report describes in great detail the development and use of short-range mobile air defense systems, drone-borne mortars and Israeli-made guided mortars. It says 120 mm mortars were used against Southern African Development Community (SADC) troops.
Rapidly escalating crisis M23
The rapidly escalating M23 crisis risks igniting a wider regional conflict. Heavy fighting continued between the M23, alongside the Rwandan army. against the Congolese army and the Wazalendo coalition, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and the Burundi National Defense Forces. SADC private military companies and troops, which were developed in December 2023provided operational and military support to the DPRK military.
Rwandan military interventions and operations in territories north of Goma extend beyond supporting M23 operations. This allowed Rwanda and M23 to achieve military dominance in North Kivu and rapid territorial expansion on the shores of Lake Edward.
The involvement of the Burundian military in operations against M23 and the Rwandans exacerbated tensions between Rwanda and Burundi.
What can be done to de-escalate conflicts and upgrade peace?
Neighbors can’t make much of a difference. The military option, which was intended to “freeze” the violent conflict and allow humanitarian aid and diplomatic interventions, has failed.
In 2022 an East African Community regional initiative to regional power development to arrest the violent conflict failed and was he hastily retired. SADC has deployed its standby force in eastern DRC, with a similar purpose, and seemingly similar minimal chances of success.
To what extent can diplomatic interventions by the DPRK’s neighbors, the African Union, or a combination of them and the UN, make a difference?
AU mediator and president of Angola Joao Lourenco seems to be making progress. His efforts are aimed at restarting the peace process and opening direct dialogue between the governments of the DRC and Rwanda.
At a ministerial meeting in Luanda on March 21, 2024senior government officials representing the DRC, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya and Rwanda agreed to recognize the Luanda and Nairobi peace processes, both signed between June and July 2022, as key to achieving peace and security in eastern DRC.
They called for a supervised ceasefire. It would include a process of disengagement of forces, neutralization of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and confidence-building measures between the parties to the conflict.
However, two issues remain outstanding, according to the UN report. For the Congolese, the disengagement of forces means the withdrawal of Rwanda from its territory. For Rwanda, it entails a supervised ceasefire between the Congolese army and M23, accompanied by a disengagement process.
Regional leaders have an important role to play
The commitment to peace by the leaders of the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya seems to be the only ‘game in town’. But like the UN report makes it clear that, in the absence of mediation, there is a real risk that the conflict could escalate into a wider regional conflict involving Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and the DRC.
It is not clear that the main protagonists β Congolese presidents Felix Tshisekedi and his Rwandan counterpart Paul Kagame β are ready to reconcile. Personal mediation required. The role of outsiders, including the US, the European Union, China and Russia, in consultation with the UN and the African Union, can become key to unlocking progress.
The SADC military mission must either expand its footprint and neutralize M23 in order for diplomats to seek mediation or withdraw. Given its challenges and those faced by the outgoing East African force in dealing with violent extremism and criminal gangs, much strategic thinking is needed before a decision to enforce peace is made. This is vital given the new forms of warfare.
If a ceasefire can be negotiated, a strong African Union-led peace support operation will be needed to replace the UN and SADC missions – with sole financial and logistical support from international partners.
Regional leaders from Angola, South Africa, Kenya and Tanzania must exert maximum influence on the leaders of Congo and Rwanda to follow the path to peace.