Burkina Faso: Eruption of Political Violence in the Central East
Constant attacks from Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and counterattacks by security forces and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) in the Central East region more than doubled in April compared to the previous month, with fighting involving JNIM in the Central East region the highest recorded so far in 2024. Most of the violence was concentrated in Koulpelogo province, where JNIM attacked a police unit in the village of Yourkoudghin, resulting in 35 reported deaths. Burkinabe forces responded with airstrikes against JNIM bases in the Turel forest, reportedly killing several militants. The violence in Kulpelogo province is relatively recent but quickly escalated after becoming the focus of conflict due to its strategic importance in the region. It provides access to resources through artisanal mining and is an important transit route for militants. The province hosts seasonal movements of goods and livestock and is covered by dense forests, including Tiourel, Kabonga, Bittou, Kankamogre and Ouarweogo, which provide bases for militant operations, logistics and cross-border mobility.
Democratic Republic of Congo: Fatal Targeting of Civilians by ADF
While much of the international attention on the Democratic Republic of Congo remains focused on The continued push of the M23 towards Goma, last month’s targeting of civilians by the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) was the deadliest since August 2023. In April, events targeting civilians by the ADF increased by 60% from the previous month, with numerous attacks in the Beni areas , Irumu and Mambasa. Violence was particularly intense around the community of Mangina, Beni, where the ADF killed at least 28 civilians and burned health facilities. The increase in civilian targeting follows the death of two ADF leaders earlier in April, known as “Dr. Musa’ and ‘Baghdad’, during joint Congolese and Ugandan military operations in early April.3 Cooperative military operations between the DRC and Uganda have pushed the ADF out of many strongholds and forced operations into smaller, mobile groups .4 However, the ADF remains the most violent and lethal armed group against civilians in the DRC so far in 2024 — reported civilian deaths from ADF violence alone are more than all civilian deaths from violence perpetrated by other armed groups in DRC together between January and April.
Fighting escalated in the disputed southern Tigray belt last month after initial clashes earlier this year, with fresh fighting between Tigray and Amhara militias for the first time since October 2022. ACLED records 20 battles in April in Southern Tigray across the Alamata, Mekhoni, Ofla, Raya Alamata, and Zata wore. Most of the fighting took place between April 13 and 15, when the Ethiopian army took control of the city of Alamata. The government accused the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) of violating the 2022 Pretoria Agreement and invading the zones, a claim denied by the Interim Regional Administration of Tigray.5 The violence in the southern Tigray zone has reportedly displaced more than 50,000 people. further complicating the already fragile status of the 2022 Pretoria Peace Agreement.6 Among the clauses of the agreement is federal assistance for the return of displaced persons to their villages, a necessary step before the local population can vote in a referendum to decide on the status of the disputed territories .7 In April, people displaced from their villages in southern Tigray demonstrated to demand the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement, following similar protests in January.
*For more details on the Tigray conflict and weekly updates on Ethiopia, seeof ACLED Ethiopian Peace Observatory page and recently published Year in Reviewcommemorating three years of the project.
Ahead of the May 29 election, South Africa continued to see increased levels of protests in April, largely due to socio-economic struggles and growing popular discontent with the current government. ACLED records more than 175 demonstrations in April. Almost 30% of all demonstrations took place in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) province, which remains a key battleground for the upcoming elections (*for more, see ACLED’s *March Regional Review). The province of KZN remains a historical stronghold for former president Jacob Zuma. On April 9, South Africa’s Electoral Tribunal rejected an appeal barring Zuma from running in the upcoming election, allowing the former president to enter the list of candidates. The decision represented another victory for the politician and his fledgling political party, uMkhonto weSizwe (MK).8 Zuma’s return to the political arena in late 2023 followed his growing criticism of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party, which was previously headed by Zuma. Several reports signal a decline in support for the ANC,10 a party that has been in power for three decades since the end of apartheid. The loss of an absolute majority may force the political party, for the first time, to form coalitions to retain power, creating room for political compromise and possible policy changes.11
Political violence in North Darfur increased in April as the Rapid Support Force (RSF) prepared to attack the state capital, El Fasher. With the RSF and allied Arab militias surrounding El Fasher, violent incidents were reported almost daily in the capital, which remains the only major city in Darfur not under RSF control. The Sudanese Armed Forces and their allies defended their last regional stronghold through air and ground operations against the RSF in and around El Fasher. The deteriorating security situation in the region has drawn significant international attention to the potential for worsening humanitarian crises and ethnic cleansing.12 In April, ACLED records at least 19 incidents where the RSF and allied Arab militias attacked Zaghawa civilians in Darfur. The current situation in North Darfur raises concerns of a possible escalation of ethnic violence, drawing parallels with the RSF’s targeting of ethnic Masalit in West Darfur, which rights groups believe constitutes ethnic cleansing and war crimes.13
For more details on the conflict in Sudan, see ACLED’s Report on the situation of a year of war in Sudan.